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Race is fundamental in shaping the development of Australian law just as it has played its part in other 
former colonies, such as the United States, where a body of critical race theory has been established on 
the basis of this premise. Drawing on this theory I argue that the possessive logic of patriarchal white 
sovereignty works ideologically to naturalise the nation as a white possession by informing and 
circulating a coherent set of meanings about white possession as part of common sense knowledge and 
socially produced conventions in the High Court's Yorta Yorta decision. 
Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable [person] could doubt it? (Bertrand 
Russell 1983:1). 
Introduction 
1. After the Mabo decision, the subsequent introduction of the Native Title Act (1993) and extensive 
community consultation, the Yorta Yorta people decided in January to lodge an application for 
determination of native title with the national Native Title Tribunal (Atkinson 2000:1-8). The Native Title 
Tribunal accepted the application and began mediation with interested parties to the claim. As no 
mediated agreements could be reached through the Tribunal’s processes, in April 1995 the application 
was lodged in the Federal Court. In preparation for the arduous task before them, the Yorta Yorta 
prepared for trial by collecting as much evidence as possible to substantiate their case. They carried out 
extensive archival and field research as well as employing experts to assist in developing different forms 
of evidence. The Age newspaper reported that the evidence occupied 15 metres of shelf space in the 
Judge’s chambers. 
2. In December 1998, the primary judge of the Federal Court, Justice Olney found that  
the facts in this case lead inevitably to the conclusion that before the end of the 19th century the ancestors 
through whom the claimants claim title had ceased to occupy their traditional lands in accordance with their 
traditional laws and customs. The tide of history has indeed washed away any real acknowledgement of their 
traditional lands in accordance with their traditional laws and any real observance of their traditional customs’ 
(Gaurdron & Kirby 2001: para 107).  
On the basis of this determination the Yorta Yorta appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court where 
two of the three judges dismissed the appeal. By special leave the Yorta Yorta then appealed to the 
High Court, which gave its determination on the 12th of December 2001. Five of the seven Justices 
agreed that, ‘the forebears of the claimants had ceased to occupy their lands in accordance with 
traditional laws and customs and that there was no evidence that they continued to acknowledge and 
observe those laws and customs’ (Gleeson, Gummow & Hayne 2001: para 96). 
3. Apart from reports in the press, there has been little engagement with the High and Federal Courts’ 
decisions regarding the Yorta Yorta. There appears to be virtually no critique from bodies such as law 
societies, bar associations and the international Commission of Jurists who are part of the normative 
system of law. Only a few critiques by individual lawyers, historians and political scientists have been 
made addressing legal, political and historical issues (Pearson 2003; Buchan 2002, Paul & Gray 2002, 
Seidel 2004). However, their work tends to overlook the fundamental role that race played in the 
development of the decision. Perhaps this is because politicians and the media believe that ‘race’ no 
longer matters in ‘settler’ democracies such as Australia. Public discourse promotes the idea that 
Australia as a nation, has become race-blind, inclusive and tolerant as the racial barriers and laws that 
explicitly discriminated against Indigenous people and kept Australia white, have been eliminated. 
Australia promotes itself as an egalitarian society based on a fair go for all, a society in which equal 
opportunity enables meritocracy to flourish. Therefore ‘race’ appears to matter little in the distribution of 
resources such as jobs, power, wealth, land and social prestige. The assumption is that society 
operates according to neutral, rational and just ways of distributing resources. 
4. As a civilised nation Australia has the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 to deal with the misconduct of 
individuals who have transgressed the norm by their overtly racially discriminatory behaviour. By 
reducing racism to the transgressive behaviour of a few individuals Australian law acknowledges racism 
while insisting ‘on its irregular occurrence and limited significance. Liberal race reform [in the form of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 has] thus served to legitimise the myth of [Australian] meritocracy’ and 
equal opportunity (Freeman 1995:29-32). Racial discrimination in Australia is not associated with the 
unacknowledged culturally sanctioned beliefs that defend the advantages white people have because of 
the theft of Indigenous lands. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 provides no legal redress for the 
extinguishment of native title in the context of the Native Title Act 1993, as amended, where native title 
is the only title that can be extinguished by other tenures (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social 
Justice Commissioner 2002:79). 
5. Race has shaped the development of Australian law just as it has influenced the morphology of law in 
other former colonies, such as the United States, where a body of critical race theory has emerged to 
reveal the racialisation of law. In this paper I reveal how the possessive logic of patriarchal white 
sovereignty works ideologically, that is it operates at the level of beliefs, and discursively at the level of 
epistemology, to naturalise the nation as a white possession. Australia was acquired in the name of the 
King of England. As such patriarchal white sovereignty is a regime of power that derives from the illegal 
act of possession and is most acutely manifested in the form of the Crown and the judiciary. The crown 
holds exclusive possession of its territory, which is the very foundation of the nation-state. The nation-
state in turn confers patriarchal white sovereignty on its citizens through what Carol Pateman argues is 
the sexual contract (1988). However, not all citizens benefit from or exercise patriarchal white 
sovereignty equally. Race, class, gender, sexuality and ableness are markers that circumscribe the 
performance of patriarchal white sovereignty by citizens within Australian society. The possessive logic 
of patriarchal white sovereignty is predicated on exclusion; that is it denies and refuses what it does not 
own - the sovereignty of the Indigenous other. Here I use the concept ‘possessive logic’ to denote a 
mode of rationalisation, rather than a set of positions that produce a more or less inevitable answer, that 
is underpinned by an excessive desire to invest in reproducing and reaffirming the nation-state’s 
ownership, control and domination. As such it is operationalised to circulate sets of meanings about 
white ownership of the nation, as part of common sense knowledge, decision making and socially 
produced conventions.  
6. The possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty is deployed to promote the idea of race 
neutrality through concepts attached to the ideals of democracy such as egalitarianism, equity and equal 
opportunity. This allows patriarchal white sovereignty to remain transparent and invisible - two key 
attributes of its power. Yet as the premise of white national identity it defines ‘the human condition…it 
alone defines normality and fully inhabits its’ (Dyer 1997:9-10). The law in Australian society is one of 
the key institutions through which the possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty operates. White 
patriarchs designed and established the legal and political institutions that control and maintain the 
social structure under which we now live. White Anglo heterosexual, abled and middle class males are 
overly represented in government, legislatures, bureaucracies, the legal profession and the judiciary 
where ‘they shape legislation, administration and judicial texts in their own image and to their own 
advantage’ (Thornton 1995:88).  
7. For over two hundred years the possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty has served to define 
the attributes of person-hood and property through the law. The theft of Indigenous lands was ratified by 
bestowing and ‘acknowledging the property rights of whites in [Indigenous lands]. Only white possession 
and occupation of land was validated and therefore privileged as a basis for property rights’ (Harris 
1995:278). The possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty was deployed in defining who was, and 
who was not, white, conferring privilege by identifying what legal entitlements accrued to those 
categorised as white. At the beginning of the twentieth century this same logic was operative making 
whiteness itself a visible form of property in Australian law through the Immigration Restriction Act of 
1901, and at the commencement of the twenty-first century it continues to function invisibly informing the 
legal exclusion of refugees. The possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty operates to 
discriminate in favour of itself, ensuring it protects and maintains its interest by the continuing denial and 
exclusion of Indigenous sovereignty. This logic is evident in the High Court’s Yorta Yorta decision. 
8. The High Court decision on the Yorta Yorta’s appeal of the Full Federal Court’s determination on their 
native title consisted of four separate judgements. The majority decision was a combination of three 
judgements: a collective judgement by Gleeson, Gummow and Hayne and individual judgements by 
McHugh and Callinan. Kirby and Gaudron together gave a dissenting judgement upholding the Yorta 
Yorta’s appeal. I begin by summarising some of the key points made in each of the Judges’ 
determinations regarding ‘tradition’, ‘occupation’, ‘continuity’ and the role of the common law. 
9. Gleeson et al began their judgement by stating that ‘much of the argument of the present appeal was 
directed to what is meant by par (C) in section 223 (1) of the Native Title Act’ (Gleeson et al 2001: para 
28). This section states that native title rights and interests are defined as 
The communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in 
relation to land or waters, where: 
 
a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs 
observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and  
b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the 
land or waters; and  
c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia (Gleeson et al 2001: para 10). 
Gleeson et al stated that the Yorta Yorta argued on appeal that the Full Court of the Federal Court had 
made the same error in law that Olney J had made in his decision. That is, they misconstrued and 
misapplied the definition of section 223 (1) of the Native Title Act. The error was the requirement of 
positive proof of continuous acknowledgement of traditional laws and customs. In arguing their case the 
Yorta Yorta stated that ‘attention should be directed to the rights and interests presently possessed 
under traditional laws presently acknowledged and customs presently observed, and to a present 
connection by those laws and customs (Gleeson et al 2001: para 28). 
10. Gleeson et al responded to the Yorta Yorta submission in a number of ways. Because they found 
that native title is not a creature of the common law, they argued that it is the Native Title Act that should 
be used for a determination of native title. They reasoned that after the Crown acquired sovereignty 
there could be no parallel law making system operating in Australia. Therefore the rights and interests to 
which the Native Title Act refers are those derived from a normative system of Indigenous society, which 
existed before white sovereignty. According to Gleeson et al, the concept of society ‘is to be understood 
as a body of persons united in and by its acknowledgement and observance of a body of law and 
customs’ (2001: para 49). They held that if the normative system ceases to exist then so does native 
title. However, should the content of the laws and customs be adopted by a new society then they are 
not the same as those that existed at pre-sovereignty. Gleeson et al’s reasoning supported the findings 
of the primary judge and the Full Federal court. They disagreed with the dissenting Judge of the Federal 
Court’s argument that ‘no proper allowance [had been made] for adaptation and change in traditional 
law and customs in response to European settlement’. They maintained that ‘what is the most reliable 
evidence about that subject was quintessentially a matter for the primary judge…The assessment he 
made of the evidence was one which no doubt took account of the emphasis given and reliance placed 
by the claimants on the writings of Curr (2001: para 63). 
11. They support Olney’s view that as Curr’s evidence did not concur with the testimony of many 
claimants regarding traditions and customs, his testimony could be considered credible and compelling. 
And they agreed that when the Yorta Yorta moved onto the Maloga mission and presented the Crown 
with a petition for land, in which they acknowledged their lands were inhabited by whites, their 
connection to land was interrupted (2001: para 69). This was further supported by Olney’s findings of 
the Yorta Yorta that while at Maloga ‘the evidence was silent about the continued observance…of those 
aspects of traditional lifestyle to which Curr had referred’ (2001: para 66). Gleeson et al accepted 
Olney’s findings, that some of the claimants were identified as having been descended from the 
Indigenous inhabitants who were in possession of the area under claim in 1788. 
12. Despite this acknowledgement of descent, the assumption that the nation is a white possession 
manifests itself in Gleeson et al’s decision in a number of ways. First, they rationalise that only the law 
making system of patriarchal white sovereignty can exist as such once sovereignty has been asserted. 
This is done by arguing contrary to the reasoning in Mabo 2 where it is acknowledged that native title 
was progressively extinguished by freehold title and as such Indigenous law making systems continued 
to function. Thus there is a refusal to acknowledge the Indigenous sovereignty that was implicit in Mabo. 
Second, they assume that Indigenous law and custom is only constituted through a normative system 
made up of a body of persons who acknowledge and observe them collectively and was used to negate 
native title. This assumption is inconsistent with Indigenous knowledge about how law and custom work. 
Traditional law and custom in Indigenous societies does contain a normative system of rules but they 
are intrinsic to an inter-substantiation of humans, ancestral beings and land. Indigenous people are the 
human manifestations of the land and creator beings, they carry title to the land through and on their 
bodies. Thus the physicality of Indigenous people is testimony to the existence of particular tracts of 
country. The relationship between people and their country is synonymous and symbiotic. This is why 
the connection to land is never broken and why no other Indigenous group claimed or could claim Yorta 
Yorta country. Third, Gleeson et al’s reliance on the primary judge’s interpretation of the evidence, 
despite not having assessed it themselves, is based on the assumption that he knew what was 
traditional law and customs and whether there was a continuity of these albeit in evolutionary form. 
Rather than the appellate Court receive and make its own assessment of the evidence, as a matter of 
orthodoxy it relied on the primary judge’s assessment to inform their decision. Despite their insistence 
upon objectivity, Gleeson et al based their findings on the primary judge’s interpretation of Curr’s 
interpretation of Yorta Yorta culture (Buchan 2002). They cloaked their possessiveness through 
assuming the epistemological privilege of defining who Indigenous people are and that to which we are 
entitled. This is also evident in their findings that the petition for the return of land put forward by the 
Yorta Yorta at Maloga revealed the Yorta Yorta’s acknowledgement of their dispossession. The Yorta 
Yorta did not cede their sovereignty anywhere in writing in the petition, instead they asked for the return 
of their property, which was illegally taken. Under the law of patriarchal white sovereignty, when a thief 
steals someone’s property ownership is not assumed or inferred as being ceded to the thief. To the 
contrary the law preserves ownership and guarantees return of the property to the owner. This principle 
in law was not applied to the Yorta Yorta’s use of the petition, instead the findings by Gleeson, Gummow 
and Hayne fundamentally represented the Yorta Yorta as a people without any proprietary rights in land. 
13. Unlike Gleeson, Gummow and Hayne, Justice McHugh presented a very short determination in 
which he argued that the High Court has narrowly interpreted 223 of the Native Title Act because 
parliament believed that native title would depend on the developing common law (2001: para 129). He 
held that  
parliament intended native title to be determined by the common law principles laid down in Mabo v 
Queensland [No 2] [68], particularly those formulated by Brennan J in his judgement in that case. When s223 
(1) (c) of the 1993 Act referred to the rights and interests "recognised by the common law of Australia", it 
was…referring to the principles expounded by Brennan J in Mabo [No2] (2001: para 133). 
However, he states that ‘this Court has now given the concept of "recognition" a narrower scope than I 
think the Parliament intended, and this Court’s interpretation of s223 must now be accepted as settling 
the law’ (2001: para 134). McHugh could have dissented on this determination but choose instead to 
follow Gleeson et al. By restricting the concept of "recognition" to statute law McHugh and Gleeson et al 
denied the Yorta Yorta’s argument based on recourse to the Common Law which has recognised 
Indigenous sovereignty in countries such as Canada. McHugh’s rationalisation for adhering to this 
narrower interpretation is tied to his desire to maintain the national status quo rather than following 
precedent. McHugh’s investment in possession operates discursively ensuring compliance and solidarity 
when it is perceived that the nation requires protection from the threat of Indigenous sovereignty in 
international common law.  
14. Justice Callinan presented a lengthy determination quoting extensively from the primary judge, 
Justice Olney. Callinan agreed with the findings of the Full Federal Court arguing that the Yorta Yorta 
did not identify their rights and interests in land according to traditional laws and customs which could be 
recognised by the common law (2001: para 174). He stated that the Yorta Yorta were disadvantaged by 
Loss of traditional knowledge and practice because of dislocation and past exploitation; and, by reason of the 
lack of a written language and the absence therefore of any indigenous contemporaneous documents, the 
need to rely extensively upon the spoken word of their forebearers, which, human experience knows is at risk 
of being influenced and distorted in transmission through the generations, for example, fragility of recollection, 
intentional and unintentional exaggeration, embellishment, wishful thinking, justifiable sense of grievance, 
embroidery and self-interest. Anthropologists’ reports, which also relied to a large extent on transmitted 
materials were liable to suffer from similar defects as well, in this case, as his Honour held, as some lack of 
objectivity ordinarily to be expected of experts. A further complication was that some witnesses on behalf of 
the appellants, understandably resentful of past dispossession, made emotional outbursts and failed to give 
evidence which could be of assistance to the Court (2001: para 143). 
15. He further held that, as there was no precision in identifying traditional laws and customs, then the 
common law could not give effect or enforcement to them. He too found that native title is not a creature 
of the common law but combined with the role of the Native Title Act it protects and gives effect to it. In 
relation to section 223 (1) he states that the ’use of the word "connection" contemplates at least a 
degree of continuity either of acknowledgement or observance, and possession, except arguably 
perhaps in exceptional cases, of which this does not appear to be one’ (2001: para 174). And as the Act 
‘makes for no provision for non-extinguishment, or revival of native title…this is an indication of a need 
for continuity’ (2001: para 181). In relation to ‘tradition’ he notes that the Act sets out the process by 
which an application can be made for native title. It includes the Registrar of the Native Title Tribunal 
being satisfied that there is a traditional physical connection with land or water that suggests that there 
is a ‘need for an actual presence on the land’ (2001: para 184). Referring to the Oxford dictionary for a 
definition of ‘tradition’ he offers the following advice.  
 
Tradition, myth and legend are often indistinguishable, but mere existence of either of the latter, in the sense 
of a fictitious narrative, or an unauthentic or non-historical story, however venerated by repetition, will not 
suffice of itself to establish native title rights and interests possessed under traditional laws or customs by 
people claiming a relevant connection to land (2001: para 185).  
16. He maintained that in order for the common law to recognise rights and interests they must be found 
in traditional laws or customs and they must be connected to land ‘for their enjoyment a physical 
presence is essential’ (2001: para 186). He notes that the traditional laws and customs that existed at 
sovereignty must be the ones that have continued and ‘the extent to which longstanding law and custom 
may evolve without ceasing to be traditional raise difficult questions’ (2001: para 187). Callinan asserted 
that the matter went uncontested in Yanner v Eaton [105]. Referring to the Yanner case he reasoned 
that ‘for myself I might have questioned whether the use of a motor boat powered by mined and 
processed liquid fuel, and a steel tomahawk, remained in accordance with a traditional law or custom, 
particularly one of alleged totemic significance’ (ibid). He then, without exploring any evolutionary aspect 
of Yorta Yorta tradition and customs, concurs with Justice Olney and the Full Federal Court that the 
appellants could not establish continuity. In conclusion he reiterates, in relation to the oral evidence as 
assessed by the trial judge, that due weight had been given to the oral evidence but that it was not 
sufficient to refute contemporaneous records to the contrary (2001: para 190). He found that Olney had 
not made an error in finding a lack of continuity because farming on both sides of the Murray were 
incompatible with the traditional way of life or any evolution of it. He further held that Olney did not have 
to refer to all the evidence upon which the parties relied and it was sufficient for Olney to refer only to 
that evidence which he assessed as relevant or necessary for his decision ( 2001: para 191).  
17. Callinan’s perceptions of the disadvantages faced by the Yorta Yorta are not predicated on the rule 
of law; rather they are connected to an epistemological privilege tied to possession that served to 
undermine both the oral testimony of the Yorta Yorta and the expertise of white anthropologists. His 
claim that there was a lack of objectivity is based on the assumption that, where the oral evidence is not 
corroborated by the white written record, it is unreliable. Despite the basis of Curr’s evidence – his 
observations and judgements as an amateur ethnographer - being outside Yorta Yorta culture, his 
written words are granted authority. Callinan does not convincingly explain why Curr is treated as such 
an authority; instead he accepts this authority to suit his investment, which is also evident in how he 
diminishes the testimony of the Yorta Yorta and anthropologists. He implies that the Yorta Yorta and 
their experts are unreliable witnesses prone to embellishment, emotion and self-interest. And where he 
concludes that the trial judge found no written evidence at all to suggest that the Yorta Yorta continued 
their traditions and customs, such as at the Maloga mission, he held that they were discontinued. For 
Callinan the lack of evidence becomes evidence in itself. Callinan selectively chooses evidence to suit 
his self-interest; the refusal of Yorta Yorta sovereignty. For example, he refers to an administrative 
procedure, based on an interpretation of the Native Title Act, to state that a physical presence is 
required to prove connection to land when the Act makes no such stipulation. By elevating an 
administrative procedure to a legal criterion he is able to dismiss the Yorta Yorta’s claims on the basis of 
no physical presence. The idea that you have to have a physical presence on the land to enjoy one’s 
entitlements is based on conceptions of white property ownership, which requires evidence of human 
occupation in the form of fences, title deeds or residences. For Callinan, signifiers of white possession 
are imputed as the only measure of Indigenous possession. His investment in white possession is 
further revealed through the way in which he deploys ‘tradition’. He refers to the Oxford dictionary’s 
definition, which he finds is insufficient to establish Indigenous possession. Then, although alluding to 
the idea that he may not know what the evolving tradition and customs might be, he authoritatively 
states it is questionable to apply it to the use of a motor boat and steel tomahawk as in the Yanner case. 
In effect he defines ‘tradition’ by what it is not, rather than providing a definitive statement of what it is, 
as a way of refusing Indigenous possession and therefore Indigenous sovereignty. Callinan’s static 
construction of Indigenous culture effectively denies traditional laws and customs as they are now 
practised. He privileges certain written documentation over the oral and written evidence presented on 
behalf of the Yorta Yorta and represents them as being self-interested, highly emotive and mendacious. 
Callinan’s refusal of Yorta Yorta sovereignty penetrates his findings. 
18. Justices Gaudron and Kirby in their determination also reasoned that native title is not a creature of 
the common law and held that statutory interpretation of the Native Title Act was required for any 
determination of native title, particularly s223 (1). They disagreed that it was necessary ‘to establish that 
those rights and interests have been continuously availed of in relation to land, or, even that they are 
presently availed of’ (2001: para 103). They further argued that s223 (1) b ‘requires only that there be a 
present connection to land and waters. The terms of s223(1)(b) also indicate the nature of the requisite 
connection, namely, "by [the traditional] laws and customs [acknowledged and observed"’ (2001: para 
104), not a physical connection or continuing occupancy. They argued that ‘spiritual connection by laws 
acknowledged and customs observed falls comfortably within the words of s223 (1) b’ (2001: para 104). 
They found that section 223 (1) (c) does not give expression to the ‘notion of continuity as a traditional 
community’ only that the rights and interests be recognised by the common law (2001: para 109). In 
their view, continuity of a community is ‘primarily a question of whether, throughout the period in issue, 
there have been persons who have identified themselves and each other as members of the community 
in question’ (2001: para 117). They found that the preamble to the Native Title Act acknowledged the 
history of dispossession. Traditional laws and customs should have their origins in the past. However, 
‘to the extent that they differ from past practices, the differences should constitute adaptations, 
alterations, modifications or extensions made in accordance with the shared values or the customs and 
practices of the people who acknowledge and observe those laws and customs’ (2001: para 114). They 
held that Olney was misdirected in requiring the Yorta Yorta ‘to identify acknowledgement of laws and 
observance of customs with respect to the utilisation or occupation of land’ (2001: para 122). They 
stated that s223 (1) (a) and (b) of the Native Title Act does not contain a requirement that ‘the traditional 
connection with the land…be substantially maintained’. 
19.The dissenting judgement by Gaudron and Kirby constituted nine pages out of the eighty-four pages 
of the decision and it appears to contest the possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty. Their 
broad approach to interpreting the Native Title Act acknowledged several possibilities for the existence 
of native title in modern form. However, they like the other judges, reaffirmed white possession of the 
nation in their decision making by denying the fundamental role of the common law. Perhaps this is 
because Gaudron and Kirby hold that the nation, as the anchor of patriarchal white sovereignty, is 
destabilised by the incremental process of native title claims. Neither Gaudron nor Kirby are able to 
detach the technicalities of legal argument posed by the common law from the legitimacy of the nation 
as such. By not drawing on any common law cases as precedent, including the Mabo 2 decision, they 
restricted native title to statutory interpretation. In doing so they refused the finding in the Mabo 2 
decision: the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty provided Indigenous people with common law rights as 
British subjects.  
20. Pearson argues that s223 (1) of the Native Title Act does not diminish, but preserves the common 
law meaning of native title. The High Court’s interpretation of this section fundamentally abridges its 
meaning and mitigates the intention of Parliament as stated in McHugh’s decision and the preamble to 
the Act. Pearson argues that ‘at the heart of this whole misconception is our understanding of how the 
common law treats traditional indigenous occupants of land when the Crown acquires sovereignty over 
their homelands’ (2003:19). In the Mabo 2 decision the Justices held that when the Crown asserted 
sovereignty, the indigenous people of Australia became subjects of the Crown and as such entitled to 
the protection of the imported Common law which extended to protection of existing property rights. 
Pearson argues that ‘it is the fact of occupation that excites recognition and protection by the common 
law. Possession is the conclusion of law that follows from the fact of occupation…it is the occupation of 
land that the common law recognises and protects in the first instance’ not traditional laws and customs 
(2003: 22). Traditional laws and customs identify entitlement and territory, allocate rights, interests and 
responsibilities within communal possession and regulate their exercise by community members. 
According to Pearson 
When you approach the question of what continues after annexation by answering the rights and interests 
established by traditional law and custom – rather than by answering that it is the right to occupy land by 
authority of, and in accordance with, one’s traditional laws and customs – this has profound implications for 
the way in which one conceptualises native title and ultimately, how one deals with proof (2003: 25). 
21. The High Court, by not discussing the body of case law dealing with native title within the common 
law, avoided legal definitions of ‘tradition’, ‘continuity’ and ‘connection’ established within such case law. 
In dealing with native title as defined in s223 (1) of the Native Title Act, the High Court ruled on 
‘important questions and principles on the basis of bare assertion, rather than…"the time-honoured 
methodology of the common law" whereby cases are ruled upon according to established and 
developing precedents’ (Pearson 2003: 27-9). The possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty 
inherent in the High Court’s decision has produced an outcome whereby its accumulation of titles is 
unaffected and Indigenous people’s property rights are reduced to a co-existing and deferential title. 
Indigenous people now face an unrealistic and inflexible burden of proof to meet ‘white Australia’s 
cultural and legal prejudices about what constitutes "real Aborigines"’ (Pearson 2003:7). 
Conclusion 
22. The possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty operated discursively and ideologically in the 
Yorta Yorta decision to produce legal and political resistance to native title by creating judicial and legal 
impediments that were presented as though they are race blind. Yet, the origin and assertion of property 
law in Australia continues to be based on racial domination. The intersection between race and property 
continues to play a definitive role in constructing and affirming Indigenous dispossession. The denial of 
the Yorta Yorta’s native title was based on a regime of statutory interpretation that usurped the common 
law property rights of Indigenous people. By the fact of occupation under Australian common law the 
Yorta Yorta proved their native title. This is inconsistent with the High Court ‘s majority decision that 
‘only white possession and occupation of land was validated and therefore privileged as a basis for 
property rights’ (Harris 1995:277-8). The High Court required evidence of traditional law and customs 
derived from Indigenous sovereignty that existed prior to patriarchal white sovereignty, but chose to 
define them by what they are not through the Native Title Act. The High Court refused the continuity of 
Indigenous sovereignty as the precondition and genesis of all concomitant rights, interests, entitlements, 
responsibilities, obligations, customs and law.  
23. This refusal resulted in the High Court’s majority decision, which reinterpreted Olney’s decision 
through the appeal by the Yorta Yorta, to validate divesting them of their land. The High Court majority 
decision rationalised Yorta Yorta adaptation of white culture, which was necessary for their survival as a 
society and nation, as proof that they had surrendered both their Indigeneity and sovereignty. In doing 
so the High Court imputed reified white social standards to the Yorta Yorta which ‘not only denied their 
right to historical change but also the reality of their paradoxical continued existence’ in white Australia 
(Torres & Mulin 1995: 186). In the High Court’s majority decision, concepts such as ‘tradition’, 
‘continuity’ and ‘connection’ became socio-legal constructs that took on a pseudo-objective form, which 
holds no meaning or place in the law of the Yorta Yorta. The High Court’s decision holds that ‘definition 
from above can be fair to those below, that beneficiaries of racially conferred privilege have the right to 
establish norms for those who have historically been oppressed pursuant to those norms’ (Harris 
1995:287). 
24. In the High Court’s decision the evidence and legal interpretation by and of white men were raised to 
a sublime position of authority. Thus ‘reflecting the power inherent in legal discourse to corrupt meaning 
as well as the role of legal translation in that process’ (Torres & Mulin 1995:188). The High Court’s 
judges’ claims to objectivity served to mask the racialisation of their knowledge and its partiality. The 
possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty was omnipresent, but invisible, unnamed and 
unmarked in this decision, appearing to be disinvested when protecting its sovereignty. Despite the High 
Court’s decision, the bloodline to country of the Yorta Yorta continues to carry their sovereignty. 
Indigenous sovereignty invokes different sets of relations, belonging and ownership that are grounded in 
a different epistemology from that which underpins the possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty. 
This is why Yorta Yorta sovereignty will continue to unsettle and challenge the possessive logic of 
patriarchal white sovereignty and its premise that adverse possession is nine tenths of law. 
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